By Yi-Chen Tsai
The Deteriorating Relations between Taiwan and the PRC
Escalating tension and geopolitics have characterized the relations between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), generally referred to as Cross-Strait relations. PRC’s armed forces, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), have increased its aircraft incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) since 2021. Meanwhile, the PRC obstructs Taiwan from obtaining membership or participation in prominent international organizations. In addition, President Tsai Ing-Wen continues to take a firm stance against the political and military pressure from the PRC. During the Taiwanese National Day Ceremony in 2021, President Tsai stated that “Taiwan will not be forced to bow to China” (Blanchard and Lee, 2021). At the same time, she reiterated “to resolve the tension of Cross-Strait relations; the two sides need to engage in a dialogue based on parity” (Central News Agency, 2021). In response, the PRC leadership elaborated that “the speech incited confrontation, and is the source of tension and threat to the stability of the Cross-Strait relations” (Blanchard and Lee, 2021).
Under General Secretary Xi Jinping’s leadership, the PRC has pursued more assertive foreign policies like the Belt and Road Initiative, the Great National Rejuvenation Plan, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and human rights violations against the people of Xinjiang and Tibet (Sacks, 2021). The PLA’s increasing military activities near Taiwan’s air zone have sent a clear signal that the PRC intends to use its ever-growing political leverages and military power to annex Taiwan and incorporate the island into its territorial possessions. Xi’s steadfast commitment to territorial integrity adds another layer of turbulence and aggression in disrupting the stability of the Indo-Pacific region. As the world continues to watch Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine, people have become aware of how the war crime of aggression has devastated cities and led to regional instability and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine. It is critical to acknowledge the high stakes of the deteriorating Cross-Strait relations and develop strategic coercion tactics to improve military and security engagements.
U.S. National Interest and Foreign Policy in the U.S. – China – Taiwan Relations
The ties between the U.S. and Taiwan are fundamentally framed around the public law Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 and the non-binding “Six Assurances to Taiwan” that the U.S. offered in 1982. Forty-three years after the enactment of the TRA, the framework remains the cornerstone of the ongoing partnership between Taiwan and the U.S. In addition to the TRA, several bills have been passed by the U.S. Congress in the past five years to strengthen bilateral relations (Wang, 2019). In terms of military defense, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018 reiterated the assurance of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan on a more normalized process and procedures (Congress, 2017). On the diplomatic partnership and engagement front, the Taiwan Travel Act became law in 2018 to encourage officials to exchange more visits (Congress, 2018). Furthermore, the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 allocated $1.5 billion each fiscal year from 2019 to 2023 to advance U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific regions and improve partner nations’ military capabilities, including Taiwan (Congress, 2018).
After the 2021 presidential transition in the United States, President Biden continued pursuing the routine warship transits around the Taiwan Strait. For example, the U.S. sent ten warships to transit in the strait in 2021 to reassure regional stability (Grossman, 2021). Similarly, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) signed a Memorandum of Understanding to Establish a Coast Guard Working Group in March 2021. The partnership intends to facilitate more vigorous maritime law enforcement and strengthen maritime security (American Institute in Taiwan, 2021). In Biden’s most recent meeting with President Xi in March 2022, the President restated his government’s opposition to any unilateral changes to the status quo (White House, 2022). Last but not least, Biden’s signature on the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the Fiscal Year 2022 includes provisions to enhance military cooperation, periodic assessment, and continuous development of Taiwan’s defense capabilities. In addition, the bill also suggests Taiwan’s participation in the Rim of the Pacific exercise (RIMPAC) in 2022 (Chiang and Yeh, 2021).
Strategic Coercion – Deterrence and Compellence
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrates how unprovoked aggression can cause tremendous harm to civilians and global stability. Taiwan was named by The Economist as the “Most Dangerous Place on Earth”, and it requires effective coercion strategies to deter potential conflicts across the Taiwan strait (The Economist, 2021). The U.S. commitment to uphold peace and stability would require coercion strategies to prevent large-scale warfare in the Indo-Pacific region.
Deterrence Strategies
Deterrence is a strategy of maintaining the status quo. Its implication is to prevent the risks, threats, and actions taken by the opponents from coming to fruition (Slantchev, 2005). For the strategy to work successfully, the opponent, on the other side, must be fully aware of the consequences if they fail to comply. Consequential penalization should be carried out once the opponent infringes on the stability.
A deterrence strategy sets out a clear demand and states the consequences of the violation. It is a more conservative waiting game to see how relations naturally evolve without inserting too much dominance over the issue at hand. However, one caveat to implementing a successful deterrence strategy is the credibility of the U.S. game plan and commitment to the Cross-Strait crisis. As the U.S. military withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021, Chinese leaders may perceive the withdrawal as the U.S.’s lack of commitment to foreign affairs and its declining predisposition to defend Taiwan in the future (Sun, 2021).
Compellence Strategies
Compellence, on the other hand, is more proactive than deterrence and aims to alter the status quo. Similar to an offensive operation, it seeks to force a visible change of behavior (Slantchev, 2005). Strategies of compellence usually pursue the following three objectives: (1) to undo the action, (2) to halt the current progress, and (3) to change policy or administration (Slantchev, 2005).
President Biden’s 2022 State of the Union address focused on the $1.2 trillion domestic infrastructure investment and shifted foreign affairs focus from China to condemning the violent war launched by Russia (RV Industry Association, 2022). As a result, the administration’s direction heading into the U.S. – China – Taiwan relationship may remain less willing to intervene and more neutral during his presidency. Lastly, several scholars have pointed out that deterrence strategies strike the right balance of power between the U.S. and the PRC (Chen, Wang, and Hui, 2021). More clarity on U.S. policy towards the PRC’s “internal affairs” may result in undesirable yet substantial impacts on all three stakeholders.
Policy Recommendations: Preserve Deterrence and Maintain Balance of Power
Scholars have identified ambiguity as a good deterrence strategy in Cross-Strait relations, which involves the PRC calculating their risk of action and determining their willingness to undertake risks in consideration of domestic politics (Chen, Wang, and Hui, 2021). On the other hand, compellence strategy can often create unnecessary tension and provocative actions in the triangular relations. Different forms of deterrence will be discussed in the context of the U.S. – China relations to fend off the PLA’s amphibious attack on Taiwan.
Military Deterrence: U.S. – Japan Partnership
The U.S. has consistently taken a strategic ambiguity approach toward Cross-Strait relations in the past decades. More sophisticated deterrence strategies will strengthen U.S. commitment and credibility in upholding security in the Indo-Pacific region. After President Trump retreated from several multilateral agreements and threatened to cut military partnerships with South Korea and Japan, the U.S. needs to restore its credibility and reliability in the region (Mishra, 2019).
Maintaining alliance systems and increasing military cooperation with close allies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines can foster a more robust integrated deterrence to the PRC. For instance, two Japanese prime ministers, Fumio Kishida and Shinzo Abe, have publicly announced their apprehension of the security instability and political volatility in the conflicts over the Taiwan Strait. Research Fellow David Sacks at the Council on Foreign Relations recommended strengthening the U.S. – Japan alliance in responding to the PRC invasion of Taiwan (Sacks, 2022). In April 2021, the leaders of U.S. and Japan released a joint statement “U.S. – JAPAN GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR A NEW ERA” to forge a deeper military alliance that recognizes the need to bolster integrated deterrence to the PRC. The U.S. and Japan should find an effective strategic plan to ensure a swift response and joint military operations to any undesired contingencies in the Taiwan Strait.
Military Deterrence: U.S. – Taiwan Partnership
Increasing Taiwan’s self-defense capability and military readiness is one of the most direct ways to deter Cross-Strait conflicts. Incorporating Taiwan’s involvement with the U.S. Department of Defense, as laid out in the NDAA in 2022, creates more opportunities to conduct joint military exercises and information exchange (Lin, 2021). In Section 1243, the Secretary of Defense must summarize the practicability of organizing training between the U.S. National Guard and Taiwan on cyber defense and emergency response (Lin, 2021).
In Taiwan’s 2021 National Defense Report, the Ministry of Defense focuses on strengthening Taiwan’s military capability to carry out asymmetric operations and asymmetric concepts (Ministry of Defense, 2021). Asymmetric warfare is an essential concept for Taiwan’s strategic plan, which aims to leverage Taiwan’s natural barrier to disrupt the PLA’s operational strategy (Ministry of National Defense, 2021). To ensure Taiwan’s military’s readiness and leadership in operating asymmetric warfare tactics, a joint working group between Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense and the U.S. military officers would enhance Taiwan’s capability in deterring the PLA’s advanced weapons. Any form of information-sharing regarding operational experience and restructuring guidance will bolster Taiwan’s defense ability and evolve its military power into a better shape with modernized force and an ascending strategic playbook.
Conclusion
The PLA’s large military size and advanced equipment and its periodic intrusion into Taiwan’s ADIZ pose a significant threat to regional security. Military deterrence that incorporates bilateral partnerships has great potential to de-escalate the rising tension across the strait. In addition, it would signal to the PRC that contingency arrangements are in place in the event of an invasion by the PLA. Unlike economic deterrence, where policies pose costs to innocent stakeholders, military deterrence instills combat readiness to ward off a military intrusion. It is tangible and evolving as parties commit to establish joint working groups. It also increases stability and creates a forward-looking vision to bolster military preparedness against the draconian regime.
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